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A constitutional crisis is at hand. It is 2017, and a new
President of the United States has taken office.' The new President
generally opposes environmental regulations and accordingly
nominated a candidate for Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") with a deregulatory track record. The
Senate, however, stood in the way: a proenvironment party holds the
majority and threatened to filibuster.2 New presidents in this
situation typically withdraw their nominations to avoid political
embarrassment. But this time was different.
In a forceful display of executive authority, the President
unilaterally installed the nominee as the EPA Administrator. True,
this action almost certainly violates the Appointments Clause, which
requires the Senate to confirm any "Officer of the United States."3 The
Administrator nevertheless wasted no time and immediately began
the rulemaking process to increase the maximum pollutant level that
factories may discharge into waterways.
Once the Administrator promulgated the new rule, factories
across the country began releasing higher levels of potentially toxic
chemicals into rivers, streams, and groundwater. Communities across
the nation soon reported massive fish kills. As a result, the freshwater
fishing industry's nets are now coming up empty.
Several commercial fishing companies have responded by suing
the EPA, alleging that the Administrator could not have validly
promulgated the regulation because he is holding office in violation of
the Appointments Clause. The court faces a key question: do the
fishing companies have standing to raise their claim?
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court explained that "[p]arty
litigants with sufficient concrete interests at stake may have standing
to raise constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect
to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights."4 The D.C.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX ("The term[] of the President ... shall end at noon on the
20th day of January. . . .").
2. See SENATE R. XXII (requiring a three-fifths cloture vote of all Senators to end debate);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 704 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a filibuster as a "dilatory
tactic ... employed in an attempt to obstruct legislative action").
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Because "any appointee exercising significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' " Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976), and the EPA has significant enforcement power, see, e.g., Alaska Dep't of
Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 484-88 (2004) (holding that the Clean Air Act permits
the EPA to stop to construction when it determines a state has violated the Act), an EPA
Administrator cannot validly take office without Senate confirmation.
4. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 117.
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Circuit-the federal judiciary's administrative law expert5-has
interpreted Buckley as limiting separation of powers standing to
plaintiffs "directly subject to the authority of the agency."6 The
commercial fishing companies in the hypothetical above, however, do
not have any real nexus with the EPA, since the relaxed pollution
standards only apply to the manufacturing plants. They appear to
therefore lack standing to raise their Appointments Clause challenge
under Buckley.
A recent Supreme Court decision, on the other hand, supports
the opposite conclusion. In Bond v. United States,7 the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a criminal defendant had standing to mount a
Tenth Amendment challenge against the federal statute under which
she was indicted. The Court in that case pronounced that "[i]f the
constitutional structure of our Government that protects individual
liberty is compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable
injury may object."8 Bond accordingly indicates that the fictional
fishing companies would have standing to challenge the
Administrator's appointment, because their decrease in fish yields is a
separate justiciable injury from their constitutional claim.
Buckley, in short, requires plaintiffs who assert a separation of
powers claim against an administrative agency to meet an additional
standing hurdle that Bond does not. Bond requires only a justiciable
injury, whereas Buckley demands a justiciable injury plus some nexus
with the challenged agency. The two cases cannot coexist.
This Note argues in favor of the Bond approach: any plaintiff
who has a justiciable injury-in-fact should have standing to assert a
separation of powers claim against an administrative agency. In other
words, as long as the other constitutional and prudential standing
requirements are satisfied, a plaintiff should not need a nexus with
the challenged agency. The Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides
a brief overview of black-letter standing doctrine, its rationales, and
the debate over the justiciability of separation of powers claims. Part
III details the standing test from Buckley and how subsequent lower
5. See PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1194 n.1 (11th
ed. 2011) ("[Tlhe D.C. Circuit hears the lion's share of petitions for review of [agency) rules.");
John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-
Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (2010) (labeling the D.C. Circuit as a
"semi-specialized" court because of its heavy administrative law docket); see also John G.
Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376-
77 (2006) ("One-third of the D.C. Circuit appeals are from agency decisions. That figure is less
than twenty percent nationwide.")..
6. Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
7. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
8. Id. at 2365.
2014]1 507
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
courts have applied it. Part IV explains how Bond represents a
challenge to Buckley's standing requirements. Part V then argues that
courts should follow Bond because Buckley's nexus rule serves no good
purpose in the separation of powers context. Part VI concludes.
II. STANDING, JUSTICIABILITY, AND SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAIMS
This Part provides a brief overview of standing doctrine, paying
special attention to the doctrine's underlying rationales. It then
explains what a separation of powers suit entails and details the
scholarly debate over whether the judicial process is the best method
for resolving such claims.
A. Standing Doctrine and Its Rationale
Standing to sue in federal court is a question of jurisdiction.9
Article III courts cannot entertain an action in which the plaintiff
lacks a sufficient interest in the outcome.'0 Standing requirements fall
into two general categories." First, the case-or-controversy clause in
Article III imposes three constitutional requirements that a litigant
must satisfy to have standing in federal court: (1) injury-in-fact,
(2) traceability, and (3) redressability.12 An injury-in-fact is a "concrete
and particularized" harm that is "actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical."3 The injury must also be "fairly traceable" to the
defendant's conduct and not "the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court."14 Finally, a favorable decision
must "likely" redress the plaintiffs injury. 15
Parties who meet the basic constitutional standing
requirements may nevertheless lack standing due to the second class
of requirements: the prudential standing rules.16 These prudential
9. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A plaintiffs standing is a jurisdictional
matter for Art. III courts . . . ."); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973)
(noting that federal courts do not have jurisdiction if the plaintiff does not allege a cognizable
injury).
10. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining that the "gist" of standing
is whether the plaintiff has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy").
11. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
13. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
14. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
15. See id. at 561 ("[I]t must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (listing the prudential standing requirements).
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limitations are "merely ... part of judicial self-government" and are
not constitutionally mandated.17 Just like the constitutional standing
requirements, there are three basic prudential rules. First, a litigant
must assert his or her own interests, not the interests of third
parties.'8 Second, courts will decline to entertain cases based only on
"generalized grievances"-a mere interest in the government abiding
by the law.'9 Lastly, a plaintiffs suit must fall within the "zone of
interests" protected by the relevant statute.20
The Justices did not spin this spider web of standing rules
simply to ensnare unsuspecting suitors; rather, the doctrine helps
ensure that disputes before federal courts are in fact judicially
manageable.21 Judges have limited abilities and resources. The
judiciary-unlike Congress and the President-lacks an independent,
external fact-finding arm.22 Judges must therefore rely, as the
Supreme Court has explained, on the "parties' treatment of the facts
and claims before it to develop its rules of law."23 Otherwise, a court
may inaccurately resolve cases in which the parties present
hypothetical harms with few specific facts, because courts lack most
ability to do independent, outside fact finding.24 Stare decisis,
17. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
18. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474. But see, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) (allowing attorney to challenge drug-forfeiture statute
applied to client when confiscated assets would be used to pay legal fees); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 194-97 (1976) (permitting vendor to raise customer's Equal Protection Clause claims).
19. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("[T]he Court has held that when the
asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
20. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
21. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 ("In essence the question of standing .... is founded in
concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."); 13A
WRIGHT & MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.3 (3d ed. 2012) ("Standing
and other concepts of justiciability have been developed as means of limiting the role played by
courts in society."); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens
and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 317 (2001) ("Over the past three
decades, the Supreme Court has used standing doctrine to restrict the ability of private citizens
to vindicate broad public rights and, concomitantly, to limit the authority of Congress to vest
such power in the citizenry.").
22. Courts do not have the ability to perform general investigations like congressional
committees or utilize administrative agencies to gather facts. See WRIGHT & MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 21, § 3531.3 ("[Jludicial procedures simply do not provide as comprehensive a body of
information for decision as do legislative procedures. The rules of evidence, the traditions of
adversary litigation, and limitations of judicial competence preclude the fully informed decision
that can be made by legislative or administrative procedures."). Courts do, of course, have an
internal fact-finder: the judge or jury, depending on the case.
23. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
24. WRIGHT& MILLER ETAL., supra note 21, § 3531.3.
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moreover, compounds the consequences of any resulting errors.25 On a
separate note, if the plaintiff does not have a concrete injury, a court
might misjudge the scope of the injury and grant unnecessarily broad
relief, unjustly enriching the plaintiff.26 Broader standing rules would
also allow more litigants to bring suits, thus burdening federal courts
already working at or above their capacity.27
Perhaps more importantly, federal courts have consistently
stated that standing is crucial to maintaining the separation of
powers.28 Judge Robert Bork once noted that standing "relates in
part ... to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a
rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
kind of government."29 This concern arises most clearly in
constitutional litigation. When the judicial branch determines the
constitutionality of legislative or executive action, that interpretation
overrides the interpretations of other branches.30 The elected officials
then face a dilemma-they must abide by the court's ruling or act
25. Id. As Lea Brilmayer has explained:
A better explanation of the concept of judicial restraint is based on the relationships
among courts over time. Stare decisis in effect subordinates the opinions and policy
choices of later courts to those of the present court. . . . To allow a court to settle any
matter it wished to address would give precedence to the preferences of earlier
courts ....
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1979).
26. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 208, 222 (explaining how a lack of concrete facts can lead to
overly broad relief granted).
27. See, e.g., Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts,
76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 889-90 (1991) ("The total number of cases filed in the federal courts grew
from 33,591 in 1938 to 217,879 in 1990. The total number of weighted civil filings increased from
207 per judgeship in 1955 to 448 per judgeship in 1990." (footnotes omitted)); William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274 n.3 (1996) ("The increase in [federal
circuit court] caseload is well-documented. The numbers are staggering.... [I]n 1960, there were
57 filings for each appellate judge; the comparable figure for 1994 is 270.").
28. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers. It is this fact which makes possible
the gradual clarification of the law through judicial application.").
29. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
30. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.");
see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing
the special importance of standing in "head-on confrontations between the lifetenured [sic]
branch and the representative branches of government" when plaintiffs seek invalidation of a
political branch's action on constitutional grounds).
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ultra vires.31 And citizens cannot respond to unpopular constitutional
decisions by invoking the normal political process. The Justices have
lifetime tenure and thus cannot be voted out of office, and the public
cannot overturn an unpopular decision without going through the
herculean effort of amending the Constitution.32 Our Nation is
founded, however, on the people's right and ability to govern
themselves through their representatives. Federal courts must
accordingly take great care to not "usurp the powers of the political
branches."33
Standing doctrine protects against exactly that risk. It ensures
that the parties presenting an issue to the judiciary actually need the
judicial power in order to be made whole. If, for example, the
complaining party cannot point to an actual, concrete injury, it is
unclear whether there is any wrong for the court to redress. Further, a
court that grants declaratory or injunctive relief despite the plaintiffs
inability to prove causation might block a political branch from taking
harmless action. And if a plaintiff cannot prove redressability, then
deciding the case would simply waste judicial resources. Indeed,
parties who lack standing under current doctrine may, at bottom,
simply be trying to win a policy debate in the courts rather than at the
polls. By cabining judicial authority, standing doctrine thus ensures
that the political process is ultimately the primary method of resolving
abstract policy disputes in American society. At the extreme, the
Court has noted, the overuse of judicial authority would transform the
American representative political system into a "government by
31. If the Court strikes down executive action as unconstitutional, that interpretation is
considered "supreme" and thus binding on the President, regardless of whether the President
agrees. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952)
(holding that a presidential order that amounted to legislation was unconstitutional under the
separation of powers doctrine and thus invalid). But it is unclear whether the President can
validly refuse to enforce a law that the Court has upheld. See generally Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2014)
(manuscript at 37), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2359685
(noting the tension between a Supreme Court decision from 1911 mandating action by the
executive branch and "later decisions characterizing prosecutorial discretion as a core executive
function").
32. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1394 (2006) (conceding that, "if legislators disagree with a judicial decision about rights,
they can campaign to amend the Bill of Rights" but arguing that, because the amendment
process requires supermajority approval, the "deck [is] stacked" in favor of the judicial decision).
33. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). But cf. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that heightened judicial
intervention might be necessary in contexts where courts cannot trust the political process to
function effectively).
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injunction"34 that requires citizens to inefficiently petition the courts
one by one for government action.35
B. The Justiciability of Separation of Powers Claims
This Note focuses on one small aspect of constitutional
litigation: separation of powers claims. A separation of powers claim
alleges that some government action violates the power-sharing
structure that the Framers enshrined in the Constitution. Consider,
for example, the famous Humphrey's Executor case.36 There, Congress
had insulated the commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission
from presidential removal save for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office."37 Article II, however, commands the President
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and the prior case
of Myers v. United States had held that the power to unilaterally
remove executive officers was essential to fulfilling that constitutional
duty.38 Humphrey's Executor thus posed a question of the
Constitution's power-sharing structure: does a for-cause removal
restriction unduly trammel the President's authority?39
The separation of powers is even more important today given
the expansion of the administrative state. Although Congress
sometimes directly imposes duties on private citizens or
organizations,40 it much more frequently delegates general lawmaking
34. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) ("To permit
a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court to rule on important constitutional
issues in the abstract would .. . open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing
'government by injunction.' ").
35. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974):
[T]he Founding Fathers [did not] intend[] to set up something in the nature of an
Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the
National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Constitution created
a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their
constituents at stated periods .... Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the
traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent
in performing duties committed to them.
36. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619 (1935).
37. Id.
38. 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
39. The court answered in the negative. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631-32. That
decision's propriety is still debated. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725-26 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Humphrey's Executor "gutt[ed], in six quick pages devoid of
textual or historical precedent . . [the] 70-page opinion" in Myers).
40. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580-81 (2012) (challenging the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as exceeding
Congress's Article I powers).
2014] SEPARATION OF POWERS STANDING 513
authority to an administrative agency.41 Such delegations blur the
traditional boundaries between executive, legislative, and judicial
power.42 In today's legal environment, therefore, courts must even
more diligently ensure that Congress's new and experimental power-
delegating schemes conform to the Constitution's structural
protections. And of course, courts cannot accomplish this task unless
litigants have standing to bring separation of powers claims.
Beyond standing doctrine, however, there is a deeper debate
that underlies all separation of powers cases: should the Judiciary be
policing interactions between the political branches at all? Professor
Jesse Choper argues that the Judiciary should completely avoid
separation of powers conflicts between the legislative and executive
branches.43 He believes that courts should instead dismiss such cases
as nonjusticiable political questions:
The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning the
respective powers of Congress and the President vis-A-vis one another; rather, the
ultimate constitutional issues of whether executive action (or inaction) violates the
prerogatives of Congress or whether legislative action (or inaction) transgresses the
realm of the President should be held to be nonjusticiable, their final resolution to be
remitted to the interplay of the national political process.
44
This "political process" perspective argues that the Framers did not
envision judicial enforcement of separation of powers principles even if
they believed diffuse power protected individual rights.45 Professor
Choper relies heavily on Justice Stone's famous footnote in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.4 6 to support his nonjusticiability
41. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (defining "organic statute").
42. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877-78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
43. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980);
see also John J. Gibbons, The Court's Role in Interbranch Disputes over Oversight of Agency
Rulemaking, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 992-93 (1993) ("Unfortunately, by reaching out to decide
separation of powers issues of dubious justiciability, the Court itself seems bent on becoming just
another player in the game of Washington power politics."). But see Martin H. Redish &
Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern" The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation
of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 492 & nn.230-31 (1991) (noting that "Dean Choper's theory
has been the subject of substantial scholarly commentary, much of it critical," and providing
sources to that effect).
44. CHOPER, supra note 43, at 263.
45. Id. at 268 (finding support as far back as John Adams).
46. For the unfamiliar reader, Justice Stone's footnote is the antecedent for the standards of
review employed today by courts determining whether a given legislative enactment is
constitutional. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
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argument.47 The judiciary must vindicate individual constitutional
rights, Professor Choper argues, because the victims are normally
minorities whom the political process does not protect.48 Separation of
powers issues, in contrast, do not require judicial attention because
both Congress and the President have "tremendous incentives
jealously to guard [their] constitutional boundaries and assigned
prerogatives against invasion by the other."4 9 Professor Choper's
political-process theory argues that this interbranch tug-of-war will
eventually end in a stalemate, promising a "trustworthy resolution" of
separation of powers issues.50
Professor Choper argues, furthermore, that there are multiple
forces guarding against the primary separation of powers concern of
modern times. In 1787, the Framers were mostly concerned with
legislative aggrandizement.51 Today, however, executive overreaching
proves the greater concern.52 According to Professor Choper, judicial
protection against this concern is unnecessary because the executive
branch itself, external groups, Congress, and the electorate all act as
sufficient checks on executive aggrandizement.5 3
Despite Professor Choper's process-based arguments, the
Supreme Court currently views the separation of powers as a
protector of individual rights, which counsels in favor of judicially
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities . . . [nor]
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
47. CHOPER, supra note 43, at 275; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-
77 (1980) (using Carolene Products footnote four as a model for his theory of judicial review).
48. See CHOPER, supra note 43, at 275 ("In the [case of individual constitutional rights], the
political machinery is ordinarily aligned against the interests of powerless minorities whose
fundamental personal liberties must ultimately be vindicated by judicial review if at all.").
49. Id. ("If either branch perceives a constitutional violation of this kind, not only will it be
encouraged to respond vigorously but each department possesses an impressive arsenal of
weapons to demand observance of constitutional dictates by the other.").
50. Id. ("[B]oth [the executive and legislature] will effectively participate in defining the
reach of their respective authorities-a process that promises trustworthy resolution without the
expenditure of precious judicial capital.").
51. Id. at 266.
52. Id. at 270.
53. See generally id. at 276-314 (overviewing and analyzing the various checks on
presidential power that, in Professor Choper's opinion, render judicial review of alleged
separation of powers violations unnecessary).
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resolving these claims.54 In Bond, for example, the Court emphasized
that "the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only
object of the Constitution's concern. The structural principles secured
by the separation of powers protect the individual as well."55
The Court's individual-rights perspective draws support from
the Framers' justifications for the checks and balances in the
Constitution. In Myers v. United States, Justice Brandeis famously
stated,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1789 not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy.5 6
Similarly, James Madison noted in the Federalist Papers that the
separation of powers is "essential to the preservation of liberty."57
Accordingly, Chief Justice Burger's explanation in the 1986 case of
Bowsher v. Synar-that "[e]ven a cursory examination of the
Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks
and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that
54. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing the individual-rights
perspective to separation of powers standing).
55. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011). The Court has also noted, for
example:
The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability. The people do not
vote for the 'Officers of the United States.' . . . They instead look to the President to
guide the 'assistants or deputies . . . subject to his superintendence.' Without a clear
and effective chain of command, the public cannot 'determine on whom the blame or
the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really
to fall.'
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961));
The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government, of course,
was to 'diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.'"
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)); and
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose
burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived
under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go
unchecked.... With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse,
we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise
of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
56. 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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would protect liberty"-is emblematic of the Court's recent separation
of powers jurisprudence.5 8
Given its concern with individual rights, the Court in recent
years has routinely entertained separation of powers cases, including
challenges to dual for-cause insulation for inferior officers,5 9 the line
item veto,60 congressional removal power over an executive officer,61
and the legislative veto.62 The Court has permitted these suits because
the alleged injuries are the precise infringements of liberty that the
Framers sought to prevent when ensuring federal power was diffuse.63
These recent cases, moreover, suggest that the judiciary is the
ultimate arbiter of separation of powers disputes. Although the Court
has explained that it is not the sole interpreter of the Constitution,64 it
does maintain the authority to determine which branch's
interpretation reigns supreme.65 The Court's recent willingness to
resolve separation of power cases indicates that the Constitution's
separation of powers principles are for judicial, not political,
interpretation. Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts recently explained,
"[T]he obligation of the Judiciary [is] not only to confine itself to its
proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well."6 6
III. BUCKLEY AND ITS PROGENY
Buckley v. Valeo grapples with the question of who has
standing to petition the courts to enforce separation of powers
principles. Unfortunately, like many other standing cases, Buckley
obfuscates rather than clarifies standing doctrine.67 The Court in
58. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. Madison directly cited the "celebrated" Montesquieu in
support of the Constitution's separation of powers principles. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James
Madison).
59. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3138.
60. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
61. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714.
62. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
63. See supra note 55.
64. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233 (1993) (holding that interpretation of the
impeachment-trial power is textually committed to the Senate and is therefore immune to
judicial review).
65. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[The federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution. . . .").
66. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1886 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
67. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III
standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by
this Court which have discussed it. .. ."); see also WRIGHT & MILLER ET AL., supra note 21,
§ 3531.3 ("Current standing law is an incredibly rich tapestry woven from all the strands that
have been twisted by the wheels of time."); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
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Buckley hinted at the standing requirements for litigants who want to
mount a separation of powers challenge against an administrative
agency, but that hint was only a single sentence. As a result, the few
courts that have tackled Buckley standing have struggled to define its
ultimate scope. Buckley, in short, is a sphinx in the realm of standing,
telling a one-sentence riddle that courts have yet to solve.68
A. The Buckley Decision
In Buckley, federal political candidates, parties, and
organizations challenged the constitutionality of the 1974
Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act.69 The 1974
Amendments created the eight-member Federal Election
Commission,70 and the petitioners alleged that the method for
selecting the Commission's six voting members71 violated the
Appointments Clause.72 Under the 1974 Amendments, the Speaker of
the House and President pro tempore of the Senate each appointed
two of the six voting commissioners.7 3 The Appointments Clause,
however, requires the President alone to appoint "Officers of the
United States."74
The petitioners invoked the Federal Election Campaign Act's
citizen-suit provision to challenge the appointment arrangement.75 In
addition to meeting the Act's statutory standing requirements,
Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186-92 (1992) (conveying three
ways in which the Lujan decision, in Professor Sunstein's opinion, misconceptualizes standing
law).
68. In Greek mythology, the Sphinx was a monster who terrorized the town of Thebes by
eating the local citizens. See BARRY B. POWELL, CLASSICAL MYTH 475-76 (5th ed. 2007). Before
killing her prey, the Sphinx would pose a riddle: "What goes on four legs in the morning, two at
midday, and three in the evening?" Id. at 476. Until answered correctly, Thebes would live in her
shadow. Id.
Oedipus, the tragic hero who had unknowingly murdered his father and who would
later unknowingly wed his mother, delivered Thebes from the Sphinx's grip by correctly
answering the riddle. Id. Human beings, Oedipus explained, crawl on all fours as infants (the
morning), walk on two legs thereafter (midday), and rely on the support of a cane in their later
years (the evening). Id.
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
70. Id. at 113.
71. Two of the eight FEC Commissioners did not have voting rights. Id.
72. Id. at 118-19.
73. Id. at 113.
74. Id. at 118-19.
75. Id. at 8. The Court of Appeals did find, however, that a limited portion of the case,
involving the Commission's ability to issue advisory opinions and review expenditures, was ripe
for review. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 893-96 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding ripe for
adjudication the portions of the case related to the Commission's ability to issue advisory
opinions and to review and authorize expenditures).
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though, the petitioners also needed Article III standing.76 But that
was of no concern, the Court explained, because "[p]arty litigants with
sufficient concrete interests at stake may have standing to raise
constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an
agency designated to adjudicate their rights."77 This sentence defines
what this Note refers to as "Buckley standing."
The core problem with Buckley standing is the same one that
troubled country music legend Conway Twitty: "That's all she
wrote."78 In a case spanning 294 pages of the U.S. Reports, the Court
spent a mere two paragraphs explaining the intersection of standing
and separation of powers.79 Presumably that is because the Buckley
Court felt that Article III standing was a foregone conclusion. Indeed,
the Court believed that the case really presented a prudential
"question of ripeness, rather than lack of case or controversy under
Art[icle] IIJ."8o The Court therefore did not engage in an in-depth
analysis of how separation of powers standing would work in future
cases.
Looking at Buckley's plain language, it appears that separation
of powers standing has two components. First, the asserting party
must have "sufficient concrete interests" at stake. This requirement
makes perfect sense; it merely restates the Article III injury-in-fact
requirement.81 In contrast, the second requirement-that he agency a
party is challenging on separation of powers grounds must be
"designated to adjudicate [the party's] rights"-seems to come from
nowhere. And unfortunately, Buckley fails to address the origin, scope,
and desirability of this agency-nexus requirement.
76. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11-12 (explaining that Article III standing rules still apply
even when a statute contains a citizen-suit provision); accord Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 572-78 (1992) (same).
77. The Buckley Court used an almost identical phrase to convey this standing principle in
two different parts of the opinion. Compare id. at 12 n.10 ("[P]arties with sufficient concrete
interests at stake have been held to have standing to raise constitutional questions of separation
of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights."), with id. at 117
("Party litigants with sufficient concrete interests at stake may have standing to raise
constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency designated to
adjudicate their rights."). Courts applying Buckley standing often use the latter quotation,
although the former stems from Buckley's actual standing discussion. See, e.g., KG Urban
Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of
Governors, 766 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985). I too have adopted the latter quotation for its
more rule-like language.
78. CONWAY TwITTY, That's All She Wrote, on CONWAY (MCA Records 1978).
79. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11 & n.10.
80. Id. at 117.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 13.
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The most obvious justification for the agency-nexus
requirement is that it somehow stems from the Article III injury-in-
fact test. Separation of powers suits implicate two overlapping
standing doctrines: the injury-in-fact requirement and the generalized
grievances prohibition. Although the generalized grievance rule is
typically classified as prudential, it takes on constitutional dimensions
when the plaintiffs only injury is that the government is not following
the law.82 In separation of powers cases, plaintiffs are in essence
claiming that the government is not following the law of the
Constitution's power-sharing structure. Accordingly, the Buckley
Court could have assumed that, if an agency does not actually
regulate the plaintiffs, the only harm any separation of powers
violation could possibly cause is the generalized grievance of the
government transgressing the law. If that assumption is true, then
even if the agency has violated separation of powers principles,
unregulated third parties can never assert from that violation a
concrete, individualized harm-that is, an injury-in-fact. The Court, in
other words, may not have intended the agency-nexus requirement to
be an additional hurdle at all. Rather, the requirement simply may be
an assumption-although perhaps an overly broad one-about how
Article III's injury-in-fact test applies in the separation of powers
context.
Other language in the key sentence from Buckley, however,
throws a wrench into this interpretation. The Court's use of the
permissive "may" insinuates that even with sufficient concrete
interests and a proper nexus with the agency-defendant, a party
might still not have standing to assert a separation of powers claim.
But when would such a situation arise? If a party satisfies
constitutional standing requirements but still lacks standing, a court
must have been applying some prudential standing rule. This
possibility undercuts the idea that Buckley was merely applying the
constitutional injury-in-fact test. And as this Note will explain,
subsequent courts have treated Buckley's agency-nexus language as
imposing an additional, prudential standing requirement.83
82. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) ("A litigant ... claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy." (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Infra Part III.B-C.
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B. The Post-Buckley Landscape
Since the Buckley decision in 1976, federal courts have applied
its standing principle approximately ten times.84 The cases involved a
wide range of issues, including the President's power to conduct
warrantless wiretaps,85 the ability of an independent commission to
investigate the Iran-Contra Scandal,86 the validity of the one-house
legislative veto,87 and the limits of the nondelegation doctrine.88 In
half the cases, the plaintiffs had standing to assert their separation of
powers challenge;89 in the other half, they did not.90
Why have courts invoked Buckley standing so infrequently?
Several factors may be at play. Perhaps Buckley's one sentence on
standing is so unclear that courts and litigants avoid it by finding
other reasons to support standing. Or perhaps the legislative and
executive branches generally respect the separation of powers and
rarely cross the constitutional line. Ultimately, though, the main
reason that Buckley standing rarely emerges is probably because
sophisticated litigants challenging an agency on separation of powers
grounds typically join with multiple diverse parties-individuals,
interest groups, and affected businesses-to ensure that at least one of
84. To find cases discussing Buckley standing, I undertook several Westlaw searches on
January 3, 2013. First, I looked at all cases citing the relevant headnotes from Buckley itself.
Additionally, I searched for cases using an advanced search exact language feature to search for
the entire Buckley standing quotation, the words "party litigants with sufficient concrete
interests," and the words "agency designated to adjudicate their rights." I then read each opinion
and eliminated cases that discussed ripeness or standing principles not related to separation of
powers challenges. The final list of cases I have identified as discussing or citing the Buckley
standing principle is: KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); ACLU v.
NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J.,
concurring and dissenting); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo,
783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.2d 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Reuss v.
Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Emps. v. United States (NFFE 1), 727 F.
Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1989), review denied, (NFFE II) 905 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. (CAAN 1), 718 F. Supp. 974
(D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, (CAAN II), 917 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd, (CAAN Ill),
501 U.S. 252 (1991); Pac. Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981).
85. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d at 648-49.
86. Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 51-52.
87. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 411.
88. NFFE 1, 727 F. Supp. at 19.
89. CAAN III, 501 U.S. at 264-65; Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 68 (Williams, J., concurring and
dissenting); Organized Crime Subpoena, 783 F.2d at 374; Chadha, 634 F.2d at 418; Pac. Legal
Found., 529 F. Supp. at 992-94 (holding that only the individual plaintiffs had standing).
90. KG Urban, 693 F.3d at 15; ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d at 675; Comm. for Monetary Reform,
766 F.2d at 544; Reuss, 584 F.2d at 471; NFFE I, 727 F. Supp. at 17.
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them clearly has standing.9 ' But despite the relative infrequency of
these suits, recent gridlock in the Senate over President Obama's
appointees has brought separation of powers issues to the forefront
once again,92 and even if some plaintiffs can join other parties to skirt
standing issues, there is no assurance that injured litigants will
always be able to do so.
Buckley standing is thus plagued not only by the Court's
ambiguous language but also by its limited application by lower
courts. Indeed, the vague language and lack of robust precedent
prompted the First Circuit to recently comment that "[t]he contours of
Buckley's standing analysis are not well-defined."93
C. The D.C. Circuit's Interpretation of Buckley
The D.C. Circuit's attempt to clarify Buckley standing's agency-
nexus prong deserves special attention because it is the federal court
most experienced with administrative law.9 4 The D.C. Circuit has held
that unless parties are "directly subject" to the challenged agency's
authority, they cannot have standing to bring a separation of powers
claim even if they otherwise meet Article III's standing
91. See infra note 123 (explaining that courts can entertain claims asserted by multiple
parties as long as one of those parties has standing). The litigation over the Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), is an example of recent vintage. See Florida ex rel.
Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270-73 (N.D. Fla.)
(discussing the standing of individuals, organizations, and states), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 648
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
92. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 514 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating President's
recess appointments to the NLRB), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). Recent presidents have
also used the Vacancies Act to appoint "acting" directors to administrative agencies when Senate
confirmation hopes for their nominee of choice appear dim. See Brannon P. Denning, Article II,
the Vacancies Act and the Appointment of "Acting" Executive Branch Officials, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
1039, 1047-51 (1998) (rejecting the Clinton Administration's claim that it could appoint "acting"
Assistant Attorney Generals indefinitely). See generally HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21412, TEMPORARILY FILLING PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED, SENATE-CONFIRMED
POsITIONS 2-5 (2008) (explaining how President can temporarily fill vacant executive branch
positions without Senate confirmation). This practice may violate the Appointments Clause,
especially if Presidents ignore the Vacancies Act's time limit on acting appointments. Cf. Sean
Scully, Bid to Reform Vacancies Act up in Air, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at A6 ("Democratic
opponents of the bill don't deny that presidents routinely ignore the Vacancies Act .... );
Editorial, Vacant Government, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at A18 (explaining that in March
1998, 59 of 320 officers whose appointment normally requires Senate confirmation were sitting
in violation of the Vacancies Act).
93. KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2012).
94. See supra note 5 (noting the large portion of administrative-law cases in the D.C.
Circuit's docket).
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requirements.95 Yet even when the "directly subject" rule was clearly
implicated, the Circuit ignored it twice. The Supreme Court only
reviewed one of those cases, and there, the Court affirmed the D.C.
Circuit. Ultimately, then, the continued validity of the "directly
subject" interpretation is unclear.
The D.C. Circuit's Reuss v. Balles96 case is the first in which a
court applied Buckley's standing principle.97 There, Congressman
Henry Reuss alleged that the composition of the Federal Open Market
Committee ("FOMC") violated the Appointments Clause. His theory
was that Article II barred the Federal Reserve Banks from appointing
five of the Committee's members (as the organic statute contemplated)
because each member needed presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation.98 The Committee, however, disputed Reuss's standing to
bring the suit under Buckley.99
The D.C. Circuit in Reuss analyzed the standing issue
according to Buckley's plain language. First, the court explained, a
plaintiff must have "sufficient concrete interests" in the case-in other
words, a "personal stake" in obtaining the requested relief.100 The
majority believed that, as a bondholder, Reuss lacked a personal
interest in the case because he could not prove that his bonds would
fare better under a properly appointed Committee.10 1 Second, the
court held that the challenged agency must "adjudicate [the plaintiffs]
rights," which it applied as a separate, necessary requirement for
plaintiffs to have Buckley standing.102 The court in Reuss believed that
the FOMC's regulation of inflation rates was not an "adjudication" of
rights with respect to bondholders in the market broadly.103 In other
words, the court seemed to employ a notion similar to proximate cause
95. See infra text accompanying notes 109-18 (detailing Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd.
of Governors, 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
96. 584 F.2d 461, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
97. See supra note 84 for a list of cases in which federal courts have discussed Buckley
standing.
98. Reuss, 584 F.2d at 464.
99. Id. at 470.
100. See id. ("In its rather brief standing discussion in Buckley, the Court took care to stress
twice the requirement that parties have to demonstrate a sufficient 'personal stake' in the
outcome of a controversy before they will be granted access to a federal court's remedial
powers.").
101. Id. at 470-71. But see infra note 112 (explaining that the D.C. Circuit no long applies a
strict causation requirement in Appointments Clause cases).
102. See Reuss, 584 F.2d at 470-71 ("An injunction prohibiting the Reserve Bank members
from participating in FOMC deliberations and decisions until properly appointed, however,
would not be of similar benefit to the appellant. In the first place, the FOMC does not adjudicate
his rights in any respect ....
103. Id.
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in tort cases: the FOMC's decisions on inflation rates do affect
participants in the bond market, but that connection is not legally
sufficient for Buckley standing. This reasoning suggests that to satisfy
Buckley, litigants must not only have a nexus, but a somewhat close
nexus, with the challenged agency. 104
In 1985, the D.C. Circuit again grappled with Buckley
standing. Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System105 involved the same constitutional challenge
to the FOMC's bank-appointed members as in Reuss v. Balles.106 This
time, however, private businesses and individuals together filed the
suit, claiming that the FOMC's private bank members had influenced
the committee to increase interest rates, lining the pockets of the
private banks while leaving the plaintiffs empty-handed.10 7 The
plaintiffs first argued that they had standing because of the economic
injury inflicted by the heightened rates.108 The court rejected this
theory, however, because the plaintiffs failed to prove causation and
redressability as Article III standing requires.109 But even without
economic injury, the appellants argued, Buckley conferred standing to
challenge the FOMC's appointment structure.110
The D.C. Circuit disagreed.111 The court saw the plaintiffs'
separation of powers claim as a generalized grievance shared widely
with other bondholders and expressed concern that reading Buckley
too broadly might result in the resolution of problems better solved by
104. Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright dissented, arguing that Reuss had standing as a
bondholder under Buckley. Id. at 471 (Wright, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wright first rejected
the majority's requirement that plaintiffs prove they would fare better under a validly
constituted committee. See id. at 471-72. He then noted that the
appellants in Buckley were nowhere required to establish that the method of
appointing members to the FEC had any direct, adverse impact upon them, or that
different and more favorable decisions would be reached by a properly constituted
body.... [T]he fact that an individual's rights are being determined by an allegedly
unconstitutionally composed body is, in itself, sufficient to meet the injury
requirement and to permit the court to decide the merits of his constitutional
challenge.
Id. at 472. While this Note's author agrees with the Chief Judge's causation analysis, the Author
respectfully believes that the reading of the word "adjudicate" as used in Buckley is too broad.
See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. The best approach, the Author accordingly
believes, is to reject the agency-nexus prong rather than stretch the definition of adjudicate to fit
a desired solution.
105. 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 539-41.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 542-43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 543-44.
111. Id.
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the political branches.112 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that
standing to bring separation of powers suits is limited to plaintiffs
who are "directly subject to the authority of the agency, whether such
authority is regulatory, administrative, or adjudicative in nature."113
Since the FOMC did not exercise any "direct government authority"
over the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs lacked standing.114
Federal courts in the D.C. Circuit have twice since relied on the
"directly subject" rule to determine a party's standing under
Buckley.115 First, in Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political
Victory Fund, the plaintiffs had standing to attack the composition of
the Federal Election Commission on separation of powers grounds
because the agency had filed an enforcement action against the
plaintiffs, which is the "paradigm of direct governmental authority."116
In the second case, National Federation of Federal Employees v.
United States, two separate plaintiffs attempted to thwart a military
base closure by asserting that the Base Closure and Realignment
Act1 17 delegated excessive authority to the Secretary of Defense.118 The
district court held that the union for civilian employees who worked on
112. See id. ("We believe that to allow all persons indirectly affected by an agency's decision
to challenge its constitutional authority would .. . require the courts to decide abstract questions
of wide public significance ... even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights." (internal quotation marks omitted)). This concern is curious considering the
appellants appear to have had Article III standing. When the court analyzed Buckley standing, it
had already assumed plaintiffs ustained an injury-in-fact. Id. at 542. Further, the D.C. Circuit
uses a relaxed causation requirement in Appointments Clause cases. See Landry v. FDIC, 204
F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that in separation of powers cases, courts "presume
that subtle variations . . . affect conduct" (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 417 (1986))); see also
Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff mounting an
Appointments Clause challenge does not fail the causation requirement simply because the
challenged officers would have taken the same action if properly nominated and confirmed).
Finally, Article III standing appears likely since a declaration that the FOMC was
unconstitutional and an injunction against it acting would provide the plaintiffs with prospective
relief.
113. Comm. for Monetary Reform, 766 F.2d at 543-44.
114. See id. at 544 ("In the present case, it is clear that the FOMC and the Federal Reserve
System in no way exercise direct governmental authority over the appellants. We therefore
conclude that the Buckley principle fails to support the appellants' standing in the present
case."). Once the D.C. Circuit dismissed the monetary injury claim, the appellants no longer had
any other injury aside from the alleged separation of powers violation itself. Id. Under this
Note's solution, the appellants in Committee for Monetary Reform would still not have standing
because they would not have an "otherwise justiciable injury." See infra Part IV (rejecting
Buckley's agency-nexus prong).
115. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Emps. v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 17, 19 (D.D.C. 1989), review denied, 905 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
116. 6 F.3d at 824 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Note following 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2012).
118. 727 F. Supp. at 19-21.
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the base had standing because those employees were directly subject
to the Secretary's authority.119 A construction company servicing the
base, on the other hand, did not. Simply doing business with the
military did not "directly subject" the construction company to the
Secretary's authority.120
The D.C. Circuit's brief opinion denying review in National
Federation of Federal Employees makes Buckley standing even more
mystifying than it already was after Committee for Monetary
Reform.121 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court's holding
that the union had standing.122 And it was unnecessary, the court
explained, to determine the construction company's standing, because
the union plaintiffs fully represented all claims asserted.123 Most
importantly for Buckley standing purposes, the court opined in a short
footnote that the union was exempt from the "directly subject" rule
because it met Article III's standing requirements.124 The "directly
subject" rule from Committee for Monetary Reform, the court opined,
was an "alternative formulation" of the Article III test.125
This reading of the "directly subject" rule appears to conflict
with the stark language in Committee for Monetary Reform:
"[L]itigants have standing to challenge the authority of an agency on
separation-of-powers grounds only where they are directly subject to
the authority of the agency."126 The "directly subject" rule does not
read like a mere "alternative formulation" of the traditional
119. Id. at 21.
120. See id. (holding the construction company was not directly subject to the Secretary of
Defense's authority and thus did not have standing).
121. NFFE II, 905 F.2d 400, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (denying request for appellate review).
122. Id. at 402.
123. Id. (holding the union had standing and therefore declining to discuss the construction
company's standing). When a case contains multiple litigants asserting identical claims seeking
the same relief, the case can progress so long as one party has standing. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 n.15 (1988) (holding that because individual appellants had
taxpayer standing to mount facial challenge against law, considering standing of other plaintiffs
was unnecessary).
124. See NFFE II, 905 F.2d at 402 n.2:
We note in passing that since NFFE meets Article III's standing requirements as
traditionally formulated-allegations of actual or threatened harm fairly traceable to
the challenged action which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision-it need
not also meet an alternative formulation of the standing test discussed in Committee
for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys... . which requires




126. Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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constitutional test.127 Rather, it appears to be a bright-line rule. And it
is hard to imagine how a plaintiff could maintain a claim under the
"directly subject" rule but not meet Article III standing requirements.
Article III sets the outer limits of the Judiciary's authority; federal
courts can never hear a case where the plaintiff does not meet those
requirements.128 There is no "alternative" to Article III's standing
requirements.
The D.C. Circuit further complicated matters when it held that
an indirectly affected plaintiff had standing to challenge an agency on
separation of powers grounds without mentioning the "directly
subject" rule at all. In Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.
v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority ("CAAN'),1 29 a
nonprofit organization dedicated to reducing airport noise sued the
agency that operated two airports in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area.130 The nonprofit, which asserted that the agency's
new master management plan would increase noise by adding air
traffic, argued the agency's structure violated separation of powers
principles.131 The agency's organic statute contemplated that the
Board of Directors would promulgate a master plan to be reviewed by
a board comprised solely of members of Congress.132 The review board
would hold full veto power over the master plan.133 The nonprofit
argued that the review board was an agent of Congress and therefore,
under INS v. Chadha, could not veto actions by the Board of
Directors.134
With regard to standing, the district court held that the
nonprofit, as an organization, satisfied both Article III and Buckley.35
The nonprofit's injury-in-fact was the increase in airport noise
resulting from the master plan, which made the group's goal of
127. NFFE II, 905 F.2d at 402 n.2.
128. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("[O]f one thing we may be sure: Those who do not possess Art. III
standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States."); cases cited supra notes
9-10 (defining standing as a jurisdictional issue).
129. CAAN II, 917 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'g on other grounds 718 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C.
1989), aff'd, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
130. CAANI, 718 F. Supp. at 977-79.
131. Id. at 980-81.
132. Id. at 977-78.
133. Id. at 978.
134. Id. at 983 ("Plaintiffs maintain that the veto power possessed by the Board of Review
amounts to 'an extra-constitutional check on the execution of the law' in violation of [INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)]").
135. Id. at 980-82.
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reducing that noise more difficult. 136 The injury was "fairly traceable"
to the veto power of the review board because that power
"undoubtedly influenced" the Board of Directors' decision to adopt the
master plan, and a declaration that the veto power was
unconstitutional would invalidate the master plan.137 The district
court also held that the organization satisfied Buckley's standing
requirements. The nonprofit's injury-in-fact meant it had sufficient
concrete interests, and the airport-management agency regulated the
nonprofit's rights since the nonprofit sought to influence local airport
policy to reduce aircraft noise.138 On review, the D.C. Circuit refused
to address the Buckley standing argument and found that the
organization had standing solely by meeting Article III's
requirements.139 The Supreme Court adopted this same analysis and
affirmed the D.C. Circuit's holding.140
The series of decisions in CAAN appears inconsistent with the
"directly subject" rule. The challenged agency only exercised direct
authority over the two airports under its jurisdiction.14 1 The nonprofit
thus appears to be just the kind of party "indirectly affected by [the]
agency's decision"142 that the "directly subject" rule filters out. Yet
neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court mentioned the
"directly subject" rule or the Buckley decision.
The seemingly bright-line rule from Committee for Monetary
Reform-that only litigants directly subject to an agency's authority
have standing to challenge that agency on separation of powers
grounds-has never been overruled. Whether plaintiffs like the
hypothetical fishing companies discussed earlier in this Note have
standing to challenge the EPA Director's appointment is therefore an
open question.
136. CAAN III, 501 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1991).
137. Id. at 265. Invalidating the veto power would have prevented the agency from acting
because of a nonseverability clause in the organic statute. Id. at 260-61.
138. See CAANI, 718 F. Supp. at 981-82 ("[P]1aintiffs also contend that the veto power of the
Board of Review "diminished the influence" of CAAN over airports issues .... The Act does make
plain, however, that the Authority was created in part to protect the interests of local residents
such as the members of CAAN.").
139. CAAN II, 917 F.2d at 53-54.
140. See CAAN III, 501 U.S. at 253 (explaining that the increased noise and pollution
allegedly resulting from the agency's master plan was an injury-in-fact traceable to the
separation of powers problem, which would be remedied by the requested declaratory relief).
141. See CAANI, 718 F. Supp. at 976-78 (overviewing the agency's organic statute).
142. Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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IV. THE BOND DECISION AND ITS INHERENT TENSION WITH BUCKLEY
The waters of Buckley standing became murkier in 2011 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Bond v. United States.143 Although
Bond at its core was about standing to raise Tenth Amendment
claims, the Court drew support from its separation of powers
jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion explained that
standing to bring either separation of powers or federalism challenges
is quite broad: any litigant with an injury-in-fact can oppose
government action on those grounds. Bond therefore cuts the opposite
way from the D.C. Circuit's narrow interpretation of Buckley. In fact,
Bond seems to dispense with any nexus requirement at all.
A. Bond and the "Otherwise Justiciable Injury" Approach
Paul Clement, counsel for the petitioner, billed Bond as "one of
the easiest standing cases to reach [the Supreme] Court in some
time."144 Federal prosecutors indicted Bond for violating a ban on
chemical weapons that Congress passed to implement certain treaty
provisions.145 Bond moved to quash the indictment on the grounds
that the federal statute exceeded Congress's Article I powers and
therefore violated the Tenth Amendment.46 The district court denied
Bond's motion, and she appealed.'47 The Government argued on
appeal that Bond did not have standing to challenge the statute
because individuals cannot assert the rights of states vis-a-vis the
federal government.148 The Third Circuit agreed.149
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with Bond: it
unanimously reversed.150 To start, the Court explained that there was
no question that Bond met the Article III standing requirements.15 1
143. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
144. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 14, Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 09-1227).
145. The facts of this case involve a "bitter personal dispute," Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360,
fitting for a daytime soap opera. Carol Anne Bond's husband had an affair with one of her close
friends, who became pregnant. Id. Bond began harassing her friend, resulting in a minor
conviction under state law. Id. Bond then proceeded to cover her friend's mailbox, car door
handle, and front doorknob with caustic substances. Id. After the substances burned the victim,
Bond was indicted for violating the Chemical Weapons Implementations Act of 1998, 112 Stat.
2681-856. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2360-61.
149. Id. at 2361.
150. See id. at 2367 (unanimous opinion) ("There is no basis in precedent or principle to deny
petitioner's standing to raise her claims.").
151. See id. at 2361-62 ("[Ilt is apparent ... that Article III poses no barrier.").
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The injury she asserted was her impending incarceration for violating
the chemical weapons statute, so a declaration that the statute was
unconstitutional would result in the dismissal of the charges.152 The
Court further rejected the Government's argument against third-party
standing.153 It explained that "[flederalism has more than one
dynamic. . . . '[It] secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power'" in addition to protecting State
sovereignty.14 In other words, federalism principles belong not only to
the states but to individuals too.
To support its holding, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Bond drew
an analogy to separation of powers cases.155 It explained that
separation of powers principles, like federalism principles, protect
both individual liberties and the constitutional structure envisioned
by the Framers.15 6 And many times, the unanimous opinion noted, "a
cardinal principle of separation of powers [has been] vindicated at the
insistence of an individual."15 7 There was no reason why federalism
was any different.
Accordingly, the Bond Court proclaimed, "If the constitutional
structure of our Government that protects individual liberty is
compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may
object."15 8 The Court was careful to note, however, that such
challenges must come in a "proper case" in which the litigant meets
Article III's standing requirements and is not asserting a generalized
grievance.159 Even so, under Bond, the hypothetical fishing companies
described in Part I appear to have standing. Their economic injury
from decreased fish yields is an otherwise justiciable injury, which
should be enough on its own under Bond.
152. See id. (explaining how Bond met Article III standing requirements).
153. Id. at 2363-64.
154. Id. at 2364 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
155. See id. at 2365 ("The recognition of an injured person's standing to object to a violation
of a constitutional principle that allocates power within government is illustrated, in an
analogous context, by cases in which individuals sustain discrete, justiciable injury from actions
that transgress separation-of-powers limitations.").
156. See id. ("The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the
individual as well" as "each branch of government from incursion by the others.").
157. Id. (citing Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 2365-66 (explaining that litigants have "no standing to complain simply that
their Government is violating the law" and must meet the tripartite Article III standing test
discussed supra notes 9-15).
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B. Bond's Conflict with Buckley
As explained in Part II.A, Buckley standing has two parts.
First, a litigant must have "sufficient concrete interests," and second,
a litigant must assert its separation of powers claim against an
"agency designated to adjudicate [its] rights."160 The Buckley Court did
not define either prong. The D.C. Circuit, as previously explained,
expounded on the second prong by imposing a "directly subject"
rule.161
The "sufficient concrete interest" prong simply restates well-
established standing requirements. In part, it duplicates
constitutional standing requirements. Without a particularized injury
caused by the challenged agency that is redressable by the requested
relief, a plaintiff would have little "concrete interest" in the case's
outcome. Buckley's first prong also restates the Court's prudential
concerns about generalized grievances. If parties merely "suffer [ ] in
some indefinite way in common with people generally,"62 they would
also appear to lack a "concrete" interest in the case. So far, Bond and
Buckley are perfectly compatible.
Buckley's agency-nexus prong also incorporates traditional
standing requirements. As noted, this part of the rule seems to
assume that separation of powers claims by parties whose rights the
agency does not adjudicate are generalized grievances.163 The D.C.
Circuit's "directly subject" rule also supports this theory, since it was
crafted to allow courts to avoid separation of powers conflicts that are
better addressed to the political branches.164 To the extent that this
prong mirrors traditional doctrine, Bond and Buckley are still in
accord.
But Buckley's agency-nexus prong goes one step farther: it
creates an additional standing hurdle that is unique to separation of
powers cases.165 Myriad scenarios exist in which litigants could meet
traditional Article III and prudential standing requirements and yet
have no relationship with the agency they seek to challenge on
separation of powers grounds. Consider again the opening
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976).
161. See supra Part III.C (explaining how the D.C. Circuit interpreted Buckley's agency-
nexus prong).
162. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
163. Supra paragraph containing notes 82 & 83.
164. See supra notes 105-114 and accompanying text (detailing the Committee for Monetary
Reform decision).
165. Not to mention that is seems to have been applied inconsistently. See supra notes 129-
42 and accompanying text (explaining how the D.C. Circuit has ignored the agency-nexus prong).
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hypothetical involving the fishing companies and the EPA. The
freshwater fishermen have no relationship with the EPA, but the
increased water pollution that the new EPA regulations permit
undoubtedly led to the decreased catch levels. National Federation of
Federal Employees is another example. The military base closure most
certainly hurt the construction company's bottom line, yet the
company did not have a sufficiently close nexus with the Department
of Defense. This is where Bond and Buckley part ways.
One could attempt to harmonize the two cases by defining
away the "directly subject" rule and arguing that an agency always
adjudicates people's rights when it causes a cognizable injury under
Article III. That argument, however, faces two key problems. First, it
stretches the term "adjudication" beyond any reasonable definition.
Adjudication in the American legal tradition entails determining the
rights of a finite class of individuals. Agency rulemaking may
sometimes single out certain individuals, but it is usually most
congruent with broad, generally applicable legislation.166 Second, that
argument conflicts with Buckley's language. If any agency action
causing particularized harm gives a plaintiff Buckley standing, then
whether the agency adjudicated a party's rights would be irrelevant;
the Buckley standing test would collapse to the first prong.167 And
since the first prong is just a restatement of existing constitutional
and prudential standing requirements, no special standing rules
would apply to separation of powers claims.
In the federalism context, Bond said just that: there are no
special standing rules. Standing to assert that a government action
violates federalism principles after Bond requires only an "otherwise
justiciable injury." 68 Put another way, plaintiffs acquire standing first
by demonstrating an injury-in-fact separate from the generalized
grievance that the government violated federalism principles and
second by meeting Article III's traceability and redressability
requirements.169 Most importantly, Bond strongly suggested that the
166. As one well-known commentator has explained:
[There is a] universally drawn distinction between due process requirements of
participation in 'legislative' decisions and those in 'adjudicative' decisions. In the
legislative context, no participation need be afforded as a matter of constitutional
right. . . . By contrast, in adjudicative proceedings-when a single person or small
group is singled out for special treatment-participation is required.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 67 (1985)
(comparing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), with Londoner
v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)).
167. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976).
168. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366-67 (2011).
169. Id. at 2365.
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rules for standing in federalism cases are the same in separation of
powers cases.
Bond and Buckley therefore conflict. Buckley requires Article
III standing, a nongeneralized grievance, and a nexus with the
challenged agency. Bond requires only the first two.170
V. THE PROPER PATH: ADOPTING BOND IN SEPARATION OF POWERS
SUITS
The conflict between Bond and Buckley begs the central
question that this Part seeks to answer: should prudential standing
rules require litigants to have a nexus with the agency they seek to
challenge on separation of powers grounds? This Note answers that
question in the negative. Courts should not impose any agency-nexus
requirement. Federal courts should instead look to Bond when
analyzing separation of powers standing. Put simply, any party that
has sustained a justiciable injury-in-fact should be able to assert a
separation of powers challenge against the agency that caused the
injury.
This Part argues that there are two primary policy
justifications for this approach. First, an agency-nexus requirement is
unnecessary to keep litigants with insufficient interests at stake out of
federal courts. Second, although scholars disagree about whether the
judiciary should entertain separation of powers suits at all, an agency-
nexus requirement thwarts the goals of both sides of this debate.
A. Bond's Approach Is Sufficient to Avoid Abstract Disputes
The motivating factor behind Buckley's agency-nexus
requirement, as previously explained, seems to be the Court's
unwillingness to entertain generalized grievances.171  That
unwillingness stems from the rationales underlying the doctrine of
standing: the judiciary's inability to accurately resolve cases without
concrete facts, and deference to the political process.172 Buckley's
agency-nexus requirement, however, does not further these interests.
170. Most lower courts do not appear to have yet recognized this conflict. In fact, most courts
applying Bond are only using it in the federalism context. E.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner,
671 F.3d 391, 444 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d
1, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Matias v. Jett, Civ. No. 12-63, 2012 WL 983683 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2012),
report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 983758 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2012). The Ninth
Circuit, however, has applied Bond's rationale in the separation of powers context, albeit without
mentioning Buckley. See Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 909-10 (9th Cir. 2011).
171. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the Bond-Buckley conflict).
172. See supra notes 21-35 (detailing the rationales that underlie standing doctrine).
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The agency-nexus rule provides no additional assurance over
existing standing requirements that a plaintiff will present specific
facts or sharpen the issues for the court. Plaintiffs who plead a
nongeneralized injury-in-fact can point to a specific, real-world
situation in which they suffered harm.173 If such plaintiffs can further
connect the alleged separation of powers violation to their injury and
can demonstrate that a federal court could provide relief, the court
should have all the information it needs to resolve the case. The
Supreme Court's decision in CAAN directly supports this notion. The
plaintiffs there presented a valid injury-in-fact (decreased ability to
reduce airport noise) fairly traceable to the alleged separation of
powers violation (the review board's veto power) that the court could
redress (by invalidating the unconstitutional provision).174 On these
facts alone, the Supreme Court apparently believed the judiciary was
fully capable of resolving the case, even though the plaintiffs lacked a
close nexus to the challenged agency.76
Further, the agency-nexus rule does nothing more to ensure
courts avoid policy disputes than the traditional justiciability
doctrines. Article III's case-or-controversy requirement and the
prudential rule against generalized grievances ensure that litigants in
federal court do not have standing to bring challenges based on
"purely ideological" grounds.176 Other doctrines play a part as well. 177
But it is unclear what, if anything, an agency-nexus requirement
adds. It is possible that, more often than not, litigants without a nexus
to the challenged agency present abstract disputes or mere ideological
173. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[A]n injury in fact
[is] ... an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). But see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) ("[T]he fact that many persons shared the same injury
[cannot] be [a] sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency's action any
person who had in fact suffered injury.").
174. See supra notes 129-42 (detailing the holding from CAAN on standing).
175. See CAAN III, 501 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1991) (holding that aircraft-noise-prevention
nonprofit had standing to challenge federal airport-management agency's master plan).
176. See Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.)
("A purely ideological interest is not an adequate basis for standing to sue in a federal
court...."(citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 67 (1986); SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687; and
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972))).
177. The LondonerlBi-Metallic distinction shuts the door on parties demanding
individualized procedural protections from widely applicable legislation. See supra note 166. The
ripeness doctrine ensures that courts stay out of administrative policy disputes until an agency
takes formal action. See.Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). And the political
question doctrine keeps the judiciary out of constitutional areas that are either textually
committed to other branches or lack judicially manageable standards. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 209-16 (1962).
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disagreements. But the traditional standing doctrines already bar
those parties from court. With those doctrines doing the legwork, the
nexus requirement is just deadweight.
B. Buckley's Agency-Nexus Rule Leaves No One Happy
As explained earlier, there are two schools of thought on
whether the judiciary should police the boundaries of authority
between the executive and legislative branches.178 Those who believe
that separation of powers protects individual liberty feel that it is
precisely the courts' role to stop the political branches from
transgressing the constitutional limitations of their authority.179
Others who are confident that the political process adequately resolves
these problems believe that the judicial branch has no role in
adjudicating separation of powers disputes.180 The agency-nexus rule,
however, does nothing to further the interests of either perspective.
Take first the individual-rights approach. If the Constitution's
separation of powers provisions actually do protect individual rights,
then courts should flatly reject an agency-nexus rule. The judiciary
has traditionally protected individual rights against majority
oppression, and "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department"181 to interpret the Constitution. From the
individual-rights perspective, then, it follows that courts should be
adjudicating as many justiciable separation of powers cases as they
can to ensure that constitutional violations do not harm citizens. The
agency-nexus rule does just the opposite.
Now consider the political-process perspective. In one sense, an
agency-nexus rule does just what political-process proponents want: it
limits the judicial resolution of separation of powers cases. Litigants
who cannot bring separation of powers challenges because they lack a
close nexus to the challenged agency are funneled to the polls to bring
about whatever change they seek. The issue from a political-process
perspective, though, is that the agency-nexus rule gets the right
results for the wrong reasons. And this point is not trivial. Without
employing the correct rationale (at least from the political-process
perspective), courts will continue to determine the justiciability of
separation of powers claims on a case-by-case basis, rejecting some
claims while letting others through. Not only will the judiciary likely
178. Supra Part II.B.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
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adjudicate some conflicts between the executive and legislative
branches-anathema to the political-process perspective-but courts
will also be unable to develop the kind of across-the-board
nonjusticiability rule that Professor Choper and like-minded scholars
desire.
The announced justification for the agency-nexus rule in
Committee for Monetary Reform-to avoid generalized grievances-
does not actually support the rule, since other standing doctrines
already perform that function. Perhaps the D.C. Circuit was using
standing as a means to allow the political branches to settle
separation of powers disputes. But if so, the court did not say what it
was actually doing.
This may not be the first time a court has done just that. Judge
William Fletcher believes the Supreme Court has previously used
standing to avoid separation of powers issues in two prominent cases:
United States v. Richardson and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee
to Stop the War.182 He argues that, in both cases, the constitutional
provisions in question did not give the plaintiffs a right to enforce
them in court:
The Court's decision in Richardson makes sense only if the Statement and Account
Clause should be read not to permit a member of the body politic-whether a federal
taxpayer, a voter, or a citizen-to require, through judicial process, the production of the
CIA's secret accounts. The Court seems to have sensed this, but its statement hat there
is "no logical nexus" between plaintiffs taxpayer status and the constitutional claim
under the clause only hints at the reasoning that should support its decision... . As in
Richardson, the Court's decision in Schlesinger can be justified based on an analysis of
the constitutional provision whose protection is invoked by the plaintiffs, but the Court
failed to provide that analysis. 183
In Judge Fletcher's view, in other words, the real reason that the
Supreme Court dismissed Richardson and Schlesinger was that the
Statement of Account Clause and the Ineligibility Clause, respectively,
do not provide implied causes of action. Neither the plaintiffs nor
anyone else could plead a legal claim resting on those constitutional
provisions. Yet both of the Richardson and Schlesinger opinions rest
on standing grounds, holding that the plaintiffs lacked not a cause of
action but an individualized factual injury. The key distinction here is
that under Judge Fletcher's cause-of-action analysis, no individual
plaintiff would ever be able to sue for violations of those provisions,
whereas the Court's standing-based opinions leave open the possibility
that some plaintiff with a sufficiently concrete and particularized
182. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 270-71 (1988)
(explaining how the Supreme Court's decisions in Richardson and Schlesinger are only coherent
if explained on other reasons besides the standing rationales that the Court announced).
183. Id.
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injury could invoke those clauses in the future. As Judge Fletcher
argues, though, an analysis based on whether the constitutional
clauses at issue were legally actionable is the only way that
Richardson and Schlesinger "make sense."184 But the Court's analysis
in both cases, Judge Fletcher notes, only "hints" at the cause-of-action
theory.185 His point is that the Court's attempt to make a "narrow"
standing ruling was hollow; the Court was actually foreclosing all
actions relying on those constitutional provisions without expressly
saying so. 86
In a similar vein, an agency-nexus rule is undesirable even
from the political-process vantage point because, like Richardson and
Schlesinger, it is a veil that hides courts' true intentions and thwarts
the development of a coherent separation of powers framework.87 A
court's refusal to hear a separation of powers suit is always the right
result according to Professor Choper. Yet if a judge dismisses a
separation of powers case because the plaintiff was not "directly
subject" to the agency's authority or because the agency was not
"designated to adjudicate [her] rights," another court could still hear
that same case so long as it was brought by the right plaintiff (i.e., one
with a close nexus to that agency). What a proponent of the political-
process perspective would seem to desire is an express explanation
that separation of powers cases are nonjusticiable-an announcement
184. Id. at 270.
185. Id.
186. Professor Cass Sunstein's article What's Standing After Lujan, supra note 67, supports
Judge Fletcher's cause-of-action reasoning. Professor Sunstein argues that since an obscure
standing case in 1970 (Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)),
the Supreme Court has conflated injuries-in-fact with injuries-at-law, a mistake that, in his
opinion, has lead the Court's standing jurisprudence significantly astray. Id. at 183-92. The
consequence of this mistake, Professor Sunstein explains, is that even when Congress provides
citizens with a legal interest, those same citizens may be unable to protect that interest for want
of an injury-in-fact. This result, in turn, curtails Congress's ability to empower individuals to sue
executive-branch officials to ensure compliance with congressional mandates. See id. at 205-06
(explaining how the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), rejected
Congress's attempt to manufacture standing).
The import of this mistake, Professor Sunstein argues, is clear: it "narrow[s] the judicial
role" in actions seeking to compel an agency to provide additional protection to regulatory
beneficiaries. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1460 (1988). In essence, Professor Sunstein argues that courts have invoked standing
as a veil to cover their actual belief that private parties must use the political process, not the
courts, to gain greater regulatory protection. See id. at 1459-60.
187. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507 (1989) ("Our separation of powers jurisprudence is abysmal
because the Supreme Court has failed for over two hundred years of our history to develop a law
of separation of powers."); see also CHOPER, supra note 43, at 260 ("[R]elatively few [separation of
powers] questions have been presented for judicial resolution-particularly before the 1970s-
and even fewer have ever reached the docket of the Supreme Court.").
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from the bench that the President and Congress should ultimately
resolve those issues on their own. But the case-by-case nature of
standing precludes such broad announcements. So ultimately, if the
political spheres are the final word on whether an agency's structure
complies with constitutional principles, then standing is merely-
pardon the pun-standing in the way of the Court announcing a
cardinal principle of constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, an
agency-nexus rule is just as undesirable from the political-process
perspective as from the individual-rights perspective.
This discussion may leave the reader with a lingering question:
does the political-process or individual-rights perspective provide the
correct rationale for dispensing the agency-nexus requirement?
Wading into that debate, however, is beyond this Note's scope. The
point is that retaining Buckley's agency-nexus rule does not make
sense under either perspective. Both sides, it seems, should champion
Bond as the proper approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the separation of powers context, Buckley's agency-nexus
requirement for standing is not grounded in the Constitution or in
sound policy. Indeed, the Supreme Court suggested as much in Bond.
But Buckley's standing requirement has not been explicitly overruled,
so courts may dismiss separation of powers claims for want of
standing when a party does not present a sufficiently close nexus with
the challenged agency. Such an approach would leave our hypothetical
fishers from Part I paddleless, bending their gaze downstream.
This should not be so. An agency-nexus standing requirement
does not further the underlying rationales behind standing doctrine,
and it thwarts the goals of both sides of the debate over the
justiciability of separation of powers claims. At the very least, access
to the courts should not turn on such an arbitrary procedural hurdle.
Bond's "otherwise justiciable injury" approach to standing in
federalism cases should therefore also apply in the separation of
powers context. As long as litigants meet the basic constitutional and
prudential standing requirements, federal courts should have
jurisdiction to entertain these suits. Parties should not have to show
any nexus-direct or indirect-with the agency that they challenge.
Put simply, courts should analyze separation of powers standing
under Bond's simple and straightforward framework rather than
Buckley's ungrounded and unjustified requirements.
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